O enquadramento dos derivativos
Do Estadão
Projeto põe derivativos sob controle
Geithner leva proposta ao Congresso prevendo rígida supervisão da SEC sobre todos os contratos de derivativos
DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
O secretário do Tesouro dos Estados Unidos, Timothy Geithner, levou ontem ao Congresso seu plano de regulação de derivativos negociados em balcão (fora do ambiente de Bolsa). Geithner reiterou seu pedido para colocar todos esses derivativos sob estrita supervisão federal, num esforço para tornar o sistema financeiro mais estável e eliminar riscos que possam ameaçar seu funcionamento.
“Há uma convergência substancial quanto à abordagem (do tema) de maneira geral. A estratégia ampla que defendemos será apoiada também pelo Reino Unido”, disse ele, acrescentando que o apoio pode se estender a outros países europeus.
Em audiência conjunta do Comitê de Serviços Financeiros e do Comitê de Agricultura da Câmara, Geithner reiterou seu pedido para que “todos” os produtos de balcão padronizados sejam processados por meio de câmaras de compensação, que absorvem o risco de crédito e ajudam a conter o impacto de um eventual calote. Esses contratos também seriam negociados em bolsas de valores ou em sistemas de execução eletrônica.
Produtos customizados, em contrapartida, não precisariam passar por câmara de compensação, mas estariam sujeitos a exigências de divulgação de informações, bem como a padrões de capital mais rígidos. A definição, no entanto, de quando os contratos são padronizados e quando podem ser compensados ainda é uma questão não respondida.
“Vamos utilizar o pressuposto de que um contrato de derivativo que seja aceito para compensação por qualquer contraparte central seja padronizado”, disse Geithner, em discurso preparado. “Os atributos adicionais de um contrato padronizado vão incluir um volume elevado de transações e a falta de diferenças economicamente importantes entre os termos do contrato e os termos de algum outro contrato que seja compensado por uma câmara.”
Geithner afirmou que o governo não quer definir ainda os contratos e sim divulgar “princípios amplos” para o tipo de contrato que entraria na regra. “Queremos dar às pessoas o máximo de esclarecimentos”, afirmou. “Eu não acredito que tenhamos feito um julgamento final sobre em que extensão queremos definir os atributos de contratos padronizados no estatuto da regulação.”
Autor: luisnassif - Categoria(s): Crise Tags: derivativos, EUA, Tesouro
Aqui do Alto Xingu, os indios se espantam com a ingenuidade e a credulidade em torno de “regulamentacoes” sob a conducao do eixo Wall Street-Tesouro-FED-Washington-FASB-IASB-BIS-OCDE, absolutamente controlado pelo capital financeirizado, o qual abomina controles ou restricoes. Afinal, alem desse eixo, controla muitos governos, nao soh de pauses avancados, via bancos centrais, mas tambem das casas legislativas e de outros orgaos de governo.
Geithner trabalha pro Goldman Sachs, não pro Governo americano.
Os derivativos são um assunto especial, primeiro por que não fazem parte do cotidiano, segundo pelo papel que desempenham junto com a moeda.
A ação dos derivativos só ocorre de maneira indireta junto ao povo, na minha opinião, são instrumentos fantásticos para se maximizar recursos e turbinar o desenvolvimento, os efeitos negativos decorreram neste enfoque devido à fraude perpetrada por operadores inescrupulosos.
Já no segundo aspecto, o problema é muito mais sutil e foi abordado pelo Papa em sua última encíclica Verdade na Caridade, é um problema moral, que vêm embutido na própria eidética do dinheiro. Como superar isto ? É uma questão para os sumus sacerdotes das finanças, especulo que um tipo diferente de dinheiro, imune a derivativos possa ser uma das soluções, outra uma curva de momento da moeda onde a moderação moral implicaria no maior benefício possível para as populações submetidas, de toda forma uma solução não trivial.
Gostaria de ouvir outros pontos de vista.
Os derivativos não devem ser regulamentados e supervisionados.
Devem ser eliminados.
Quem gosta de jogo que vá para Las Vegas, Monte Carlo ou aos Bingos que funcionam em São Paulo com proteção policial…
Na verdade quem quer acabar com a crise não é o Banco que a criou e lucra com ela, são os perdedores que estão do lado errado do fluxo da grana.
O que se quer é, a qualquer custo, implantar uma ditadura econômica invisível e tirânica.
Este artigo, apesar da erudição vai na mesma linha de raciocínio.
The deleveraging process is inevitable
July 10, 2009 3:03pm
by FT
| Comment
By Michael Pomerleano
Martin’s article “The cautious approach to fixing banks will not work” stimulated me to raise a fundamental issue that is preoccupying me as the crisis unfolds and to which I don’t have an answer.
The standard orthodox prescription suggested by Martin, Krugman and others is to contain the systemic banking sector crisis with a set of comprehensive policy measures that include a rigorous assessment of major banks’ balance sheets, removal of non-performing loans from banks’ balance sheets, and banks recapitalisation. Virtually all the analysts point out the spectre of the Japanese lost decade, and applicable lessons for the recent US crisis. Recently two papers address the Japanese crisis: Lessons from Japan’s Banking Crisis, 1991-2005 by Mariko Fujii Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology University of Tokyo and Masahiro Kawai, Asian Development Bank Institute, and Hoshi Takeo and Anil K Kashyap. 2008, “Will the US Bank Recapitalization Succeed? Lessons from Japan”, NBER Working Paper 14401, Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research.
The Fujii-Kawai paper concludes with the following: “Acknowledging the extent and depth of the bank balance sheet problem – potential loan losses – is the first step toward resolving a banking crisis. In this regard, once the government determines a rough estimate of the size of the crisis, prompt action to recapitalize the banks that are viable, but are under-capitalized is an effective measure to restore market confidence and stabilize the banking system. Then removal of impaired assets from bank balance sheets is the next step.”
In reading the Fujii-Kawai paper I find some of the data striking. First, a chart that points out that the urban land price dropped from an index of 400 in the 1990s to 100 now. Similarly, the concentration of bank lending in real estate was very high. In “Japan’s lessons for a world of balance-sheet deflation” (February 17), Martin cites an analysis of what happened to Japan is by Richard Koo of the Nomura Research Institute; The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics: Lessons from Japan’s Great Recession (Wiley, 2008) and discusses the deleveraging process of balance-sheet financed by debt. Following the unfolding of the US bubble in real estate, in makes me far more sympathetic and understanding of the Japanese authorities’ dilemma in the early 90s. Intervention – assessment of major banks’ balance sheets, removal of NPLs from bank balance sheets, and bank recapitalization – at any point in the early 90s was equivalent trying to catch a “falling knife”. Not sure that no amount of intervention can stop the deleveraging process. My take from this data is fairly straightforward – the process of deleveraging and accrual of bad debt is dynamic and creates a vicious cycle, and no amount of government intervention would have or should have tried to stop the market forces and deleveraging process.
It leads to the following question: what does Japan’s “lost decade” teaches us? While the standard prescription to intervene promptly is very nice to present, maybe we need to turn things upside down, and look at them in a different light. In a recent talk on the “Challenges to the Global Economy” at MIT (March, 2009) Martin Feldstein gave a very nice lecture outlining similar dynamics re the housing prices in the US. In America, Zillow Real Estate estimates that the downturn in home prices has left about 20% of homeowners owing more on a mortgage than their homes are worth. We are in a vicious cycle, with more houses getting foreclosed and coming to the market, leading to further price declines. A similar deleveraging process has to take place in commercial real estates, such as retail. Deutsche Bank has recently released sobering estimates regarding the prospective losses in commercial real estate. Equally, in light of the lost real estate and equities wealth, the household sector has to deleverage. Defaults in consumer credit are likely.
The evidence leads me to my counterfactual question. Can the deleveraging process be stopped through fiscal interventions? Admittedly, it will be interesting to quantify the losses and calculate the costs of intervention to assess if intervention is feasible by looking at the aggregate numbers before answering the question. I have not analysed the aggregate numbers for the US, UK or Spain. But I doubt intervention is feasible. So maybe we need to drop the orthodox prescription to contain this systemic banking sector crisis, such as:
* rigorous examinations of the credit quality of the major banks’ balance sheets, such as the US government’s stress tests, are a pointless exercise when credit quality continues to deteriorate;
* removal of non performing loans from bank balance sheets is pointless because it addresses the present stock of non performing loans and not the flow;
* and bank recapitalisation is ineffective when the flow of non performing loans will lead to future losses.
My sense is that in the US, even if intervention on the order of magnitude required was feasible (and I doubt it), the political will, financial resources, and economic wisdom to intervene to offset the assets and wealth losses are simply not there. So as painful as it is, maybe the leveraging process has to proceed and the government should stand by ensuring only the payment system, and facilitate the deleveraging process.
I realise those conclusions are unconventional. Comments are welcome.
Para os que estão atentos aos mercados, o pessoal da análise técnica está dando o alerta para The Big One, pode ser que sim , pode ser que não, mas se eu estivesse investido em ações, estaria com tudo vendido. Mesmo assim, se o movimento for muito grande, não vai ter escapatória.
Segue o artigo.
elliottwave.com: wave 3 CRASH right around the corner
I do not subscribe to Pretchters elliottwave.com nor his services. One time I did but his timing was bad. Still he has made some good calls, and yet again he has made some bad calls; and, he is known to alternative his predictions to his ‘alternative count’ scenarios.
I am looking for another DJIA downturn into The Crisis in The Fall of 2009. Often there are crashs that bottom with declines in September and/or October. So, beware.
================================================================
Is the Bear Market’s Most Violent Decline Right Around the Corner?
Is the most powerful of all waves right around the corner?
The short answer is “YES.” See an idealized impulse wave 3
in bull and bear markets.
The long answer will help you anticipate where and when …
First, let’s describe wave 3.
If wave 3 was a superhero, he’d probably be The Flash (though he could be The Hulk).
http://www.elliottwave.com/features/default.aspx?cat=mw
Like The Flash, there’s no mistaking wave 3’s characteristics:
It gets to where it’s going in a hurry.
It usually catches everyone by surprise, and
You’ll know it when you see it.
——————————————————————————–
EWI’s Short Term Update will help you prepare for wave 3’s arrival.
Steve Hochberg’s Short Term Update closely analyzes the subdivisions of wave 2 so you can prepare for the resulting wave 3 opportunity – or get out of its way entirely. Try Short Term Update risk-free today. Get the best deal when you bundle it with the comprehensive Financial Forecast Service. Learn more.
——————————————————————————–
Robert Prechter describes third waves in his seminal book with A.J. Frost, The Elliott Wave Principle:
“Third waves are wonders to behold. They are strong and broad, and the trend at this point is unmistakable. … Third waves usually generate the greatest volume and price movement and are most often the extended wave in a series.”
But to truly appreciate the power and lightening-speed of third waves – and be prepared to anticipate one – you must first know how to identify the waves that precede it, namely wave 2.
Here’s what Prechter writes about wave 2 in The Elliott Wave Principle (two words have been reversed to apply to bear markets):
“At this point, investors are thoroughly convinced that the (bull) market is back to stay. Second waves often end on very low volume and volatility, indicating a drying up of (buying) pressure.”
If you’re thinking the description of wave 2 seems eerily similar to today’s environment, you’re right.
On February 23, Robert Prechter’s Elliott Wave Theorist recommended aggressive speculators close their short positions to avoid being caught in a “sharp and scary” rally. Just a few trading days later, the market began a multi-month rebound – wave 2.
BUT … Volume has steadily decreased since that rally began in early March. Volatility is on the rise. And perhaps most noteworthy of all: The investment herd – more specifically, the financial media – has jumped to proclaim the “worst is over.”
All the classic characteristics of bear-market rallies are there. Even a quick online search turns up headlines like:
“Worst of the recession is over” ~ July 7
“Econ Crisis Not Over, But Worst Has Passed” ~ July 8
“June job bounce could mean worst is over” ~ July 7
“Wall St’s fear gauge suggests the worst is over” ~ June 28
Recognizing the personality of wave 2 allows you to prepare for what’s next, a move you really want to look out for, wave 3 – The Flash.
Third waves move far and fast. They make good opportunities for aggressive speculators, but they can become a death knell for longer-term investors’ portfolios.
Steve Hochberg’s Short Term Update closely analyzes the subdivisions of wave 2 so you can prepare for the resulting wave 3 opportunity – or get out of its way entirely. Try Short Term Update risk-free today. Get the best deal when you bundle it with the comprehensive Financial Forecast Service. Learn more.
http://www.elliottwave.com/features/default.aspx?cat=mw
Foi citado em uma mensagem anterior o relatório do LEAP, posso dizer que eles são dá pesada mesmo, neste último no entanto não tem dados que saiam tão fora das previsões do pessoal do ouro ou do DR, na verdade o script têm se desenrolado como venho dizendo por aqui já há algum tempo.
Este jogo, é jogo de gente grande, como aquela corrida de barcos entre NY e NEWPORT, onde corre o ALINGH, o vencedor dá última faz as regras para a próxima e não existe limites para mudanças nas mesmas, assim para vencer algo de excepcional precisa ocorrer visto que tudo é feito para beneficiar o atual vencedor.
Uso esta metáfora para insistir que se o Lula quiser ter sucesso no combate a crise ele têm que ser o primeiro, ousado e diferente em suas ações, a crise não foi combatida em suas causas, em nenhuma oportunidade foram tomadas medidas com o intuito de extirpar as causas, assim a previsão de colapso do Dollar e desmonte de toda a economia mundial é o corolário lógico que se segue.
Trezentas zonas de exclusão espalhadas por todo o Brasil, não precisam ser muito grandes, 100 hectares cada, um lugar onde não se nasce, nem se morre, mas que se empreende e trabalha, enfim um local sem peias trabalhistas, fiscais , civis e outras, para que pessoas honestas e de boa vontade, que tenham o intuito de fazer do Brasil um pais melhor para si e seus descendentes possam dar a sua colaboração afim de se não for possível evitar uma catástrofe, que se minimize seus efeitos.
E que Deus nos proteja.
Aqui da Praia de Maria Angu, os caciques concordam com o Indio Tupi. Não serão os ratos que porão o guizo no gato. Timothy Geithner foi um dos principais articuladores, no governo Clinton, da revogação do Glass-Steagall Act, que coroou todas desregulamentações e deixou território livre para as atuais pirâmides financeiras. Sua ascensão ao posto de Secretário do Tesouro dos Estados Unidos no governo Obama mostra que, a doação de US$ 1 bi na campanha mais cara da história fez efeito. Ele é o arauto dos principais doadores, a turma de Wall Street.
Mais uma vez se prova que negocio de Índio é tocar tambor prá chamar chuva. Não entendem nada de finanças, infelizmente.
A coisa funciona assim, têm que ter, volatilidade, risco e otários, se não juntar os três não dá samba.
O pessoal da GS não quer saber se vai subir ou descer os índices, o que interessa e o quanto podem manipular o mercado e livrar os patos da grana suada.
Goldman Sachs Likely to Post Huge Profits, Analysts Say
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By GRAHAM BOWLEY and JENNY ANDERSON
Published: July 12, 2009
Most of Wall Street, and America, is still waiting for an economic recovery. Then there is Goldman Sachs.
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Up and down Wall Street, analysts and traders are buzzing that Goldman, which only recently paid back its government bailout money, will report blowout profits from trading on Tuesday.
Analysts predict the bank earned more than $2 billion in the March-June period, thanks to its trading prowess across world markets. If they are right, the bank’s rivals will once again be left to wonder exactly how Goldman, long the envy of Wall Street, could have rebounded so dramatically only months after the nation’s financial industry was shaken to its foundations.
The obsessive speculation has already begun, along with banter about how Goldman’s rapid return to minting money will be perceived by lawmakers and taxpayers who aided Goldman with a multibillion-dollar cushion last fall.
“They exist, and others don’t, and taxpayers made it possible,” said one industry consultant, who, like many people interviewed for this article, declined to be named for fear of jeopardizing business relationships.
Startling, too, is how much of its profits Goldman is expected to share with its employees. Analysts estimate that the bank will set aside enough money to pay a total of $18 billion in compensation and benefits this year to its 28,000 employees, or more than $600,000 per employee. Top producers stand to earn millions.
Goldman was humbled along with the rest of Wall Street when the financial markets froze last year. As a result, it lost money in the final quarter of the year, a rarity for the bank. Along with other big banks, it was compelled to accept billions of dollars in federal aid, which it paid back last month.
Amid the crisis, it also converted from an investment bank to a more regulated bank holding company to make it eligible for government lending programs.
Goldman declined to comment over the weekend, pending its Tuesday earnings report.
But if the analysts are right — and given the vagaries of Wall Street trading, any hard forecast is little more than a guesstimate — the results will extend a remarkable run for Goldman that was marred only by the single quarterly loss last fall of $2.12 billion.
Goldman Sachs is betting on the markets, but the markets are also betting on Goldman: Its share price has soared 68 percent this year, closing at $141.87 on Friday. The stock is still well off its record high of $250.70, reached in 2007.
In essence, Goldman has managed to do again what it has always done so well: embrace risks that its rivals feared to take and, for the most part, manage those risks better than its rivals dreamed possible.
“It is, in many respects, business as usual at Goldman,” said Roger Freeman, an analyst at Barclays Capital.
Traders said Goldman capitalized on the tumult in the credit markets to reap a fortune trading bonds. It profitably navigated a white-knuckled run in stock markets. It bought and sold volatile currencies, as well as commodities like oil. And it reaped lucrative fees from the high-margin business of underwriting stock offerings, which surged this year as other, more troubled financial institutions raced to raise capital.
Whether Goldman can keep this up is anyone’s guess. With so much riding on trading, the risk is that the bank might make a misstep in the markets, or that today’s money-making trades will simply vanish. The second half of 2009 looks tougher, many analysts say.
Goldman is not the only bank that appears to be returning to health. JPMorgan Chase is also emerging as one of the strongest players in this new era of American finance. JPMorgan and several other big banks are expected to report strong second-quarter profits as well this week, again in large part based on robust trading results.
But to a degree unique among its peers, Goldman has turned the crisis to its advantage. Its perennial rival, Morgan Stanley, has refused to gamble in the markets and, as a result, is expected to post a humbling quarterly loss. The giants Citigroup and Bank of America, still in hock to the government, are struggling to regain their footing. Banks like Merrill Lynch, now owned by Bank of America, ran into trouble trying to replicate Goldman’s success.
Richard Bookstaber, a former hedge fund executive and author of a “A Demon of Our Own Design,” wonders if Goldman’s resurgence will prompt other banks to push once again into riskier forms of trading, possibly at their peril.
“Someone takes risks and makes money — maybe they were smart, maybe they were lucky,” Mr. Bookstaber said. “But then everyone else feels like they need to take the same risks.”
While others are shying away from risks, Goldman is courting them. A common measure of risk-taking at Goldman and other banks is known as value at risk, which estimates how much money a firm might lose on a single day. At Goldman, that figure rose by more than 20 percent in the first quarter. Analysts predict Goldman’s V.A.R. ran high in the second quarter as well.
“It’s taking opportune risk that others aren’t taking,” said Charles Geisst, author of the forthcoming “Collateral Damaged” and a Wall Street historian. “They are scooping up all the risks that are available.”
On Wall Street, where money is the ultimate measure, Goldman is both revered and reviled. Its bankers and traders are sometimes referred to as the Bandits of Broad Street. An executive at a rival bank characterized Goldman traders as “orcs,” the warlike creatures of Middle Earth in J. R. R. Tolkien’s “The Lord of the Rings.”
Even mainstream America is taking notice. An article about Goldman in a recent issue of Rolling Stone, by Matt Taibbi, characterized Goldman as “a great vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells like money.” Goldman dismissed the article as the ramblings of conspiracy theorists.
For all its success, Goldman is not impregnable. In addition to the federal money it took last fall, it benefited from the government’s bailout of American International Group, receiving an almost $13 billion subsidy from taxpayers after losing money on counterparty exposure to the insurer and has $28 billion in outstanding debt issued cheaply with the backing of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Goldman’s chief executive, Lloyd C. Blankfein, has described the crisis as “deeply humbling.” But his bank bounced back with remarkable speed. In the first quarter, it posted profits of $1.66 billion. Now, the second quarter looks even better.
“They are a trading firm,” said an executive at rival firm, barely able to hide his jealousy. “It’s what they do.”